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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Thursday 15 June 1978

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 15 June 1978.

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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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
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ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA-US: Relations

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[REDACTED] *Ethiopia has sharply intensified its campaign to dissuade the US from establishing an arms supply relationship with Somalia.*

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[REDACTED] Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu warned at a press conference on Tuesday that his government would consider Somali use in the Ogaden of US-supplied weapons--which he believes to

be inevitable--as "direct American military aggression" against Ethiopia. Such a development, the Chairman added, would compel Ethiopia to sever diplomatic relations with the US "irreversibly." This was the regime's toughest statement to date on this issue.

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[redacted] Mengistu has thus publicly reaffirmed what other senior Ethiopian officials have told US officials in private conversations over the past several weeks: that Ethiopia views a US decision on whether or not to proceed with the sale of defensive arms to Somalia as the acid test of the Ethiopian-US relationship.

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[redacted] The US Embassy in Addis Ababa believes that Mengistu's threats should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric. While no break in relations is yet imminent, the Ethiopian leader has put the US on notice that if it should arm the Somalis it runs the clear risk of losing what few diplomatic equities it still has in Ethiopia.

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[redacted] Mengistu's patience with Somalia's continued support of guerrilla activity in the Ogaden is clearly wearing thin, particularly at a time when Ethiopia is concentrating the bulk of its military forces for a major push on the northern front in Eritrea. Mengistu reiterated charges at his press conference that Mogadiscio was continuing to infiltrate Somali regulars disguised as guerrillas into the Ogaden and warned that Ethiopia would retaliate militarily against the Siad regime if it persisted in fostering such activity.

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USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Relations

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[redacted] //The Soviets are continuing to expand their role in the day-to-day operation of the new Afghan Government. In addition to the sharp increase in the size of the Soviet military advisory presence in the Afghan Defense Ministry, Soviet advisers have been assigned to the Interior Ministry to oversee a reorganization of the police.//

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[redacted] //The Soviet police advisers will probably replace West German advisers who had established a training program during the old regime. The arrival of the Soviets accompanies a reorganization of the Ministry's leadership; men loyal to the new regime are now in charge.//

25X1 [] //Soviet military advisers serving with Afghan field units were transferred to the Afghan Defense Ministry in early May and placed in every department of the Ministry []

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25X1 [] //Additional Soviet military personnel arrived in Afghanistan last month and were assigned to advise field units down to the regimental level, bringing the total Soviet military presence in Afghanistan to more than 500. Afghan officers have been instructed to consult with their Soviet counterparts before making any major decision.//

25X1 [] The expanded Soviet role in the two ministries reflects Moscow's desire to consolidate its position in Afghanistan and to ensure the survival of the new regime. The Soviets have expressed concern about internal unrest and the new regime's inability to handle it. []

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CHAD: Military Situation Report

25X1 [] *The military situation in Chad remains stable and basically favorable to the central government.* []

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25X1 [] *Intensive political maneuvering within Chad's nine-man ruling council is evident, and the French are becoming impatient with Chadian President Malloum's procrastination in reorganizing his government. Reforms--which include integration of a minor rebel faction led by Hissein Habre into the government--were to have been implemented several weeks ago.*

25X1 [] *The French plan to persuade Malloum to move ahead with the political reforms by promising financial assistance. Although they do not intend to use their military assistance as a lever against Malloum, they have indicated that their troops will not remain in Chad indefinitely. Over the past several months, Paris has been encouraging Chad to seek a political solution to its problems with the various insurgent groups. The French have been in contact with former rebel leader Habre, who says he recognizes Chad's need for continued French presence.*

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Although the Chadian Government has begun to take steps toward carrying out the agreement reached with the Habre rebel faction, problems in implementation remain. Habre is not willing to participate in a government that includes Chadian Foreign Minister Kamougue, who has been opposed to negotiating with the rebels. Even though Malloum has removed Kamougue from the government's negotiating teams in the past, the Embassy reports that Malloum is afraid to act against him. Kamougue may not have enough political backing to mount a coup, but Malloum apparently still considers the Foreign Minister a political threat.

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Although the inclusion of Habre would give the government a more northern and Muslim balance and might act as a partial barrier against future problems with the north, the French do not believe rebel leader Goukouni, who heads the major insurgent force, would join such a government.

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In the wake of two recent decisive military defeats, Goukouni's rebels apparently are beginning to suffer morale problems, and the French Ambassador in Ndjamena believes he and his Libyan supporters may try to negotiate their way out of their present difficulties. The French think it more likely, however, that Libya will decide to increase its military support to the rebels rather than have them endure further humiliation.

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Amid conflicting reports, scheduling for the next phase of Chad-Libya peace talks remains uncertain. A 7 June meeting was tentatively rescheduled for today in Tripoli, but there are no indications it will be held. Malloum has indicated his preference that further talks not be held in Libya.

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The next few weeks should see the evolution of a new government with some rebel participation. Increased tensions within the government or the military, however, could lead to more civil disturbances and a resumption of rebel activity. In any event, it will be many months at least before Ndjamena will be free to turn its attention to the country's pressing economic and development problems, which also present a threat to the government's survival.

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UNITED KINGDOM: Confidence Motion

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//The British Government narrowly survived a vote of confidence last night on a censure motion introduced by the Conservatives against Chancellor of the Exchequer Healey. The decision to make the vote a confidence issue was a Parliamentary maneuver by the government designed to shore up support among minor parties. A vote against the government would have led to dissolution of Parliament and an early election for which the minor parties are unprepared.//

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//The Conservative motion was designed to embarrass the minority Labor government and its Liberal allies. The Liberals had earlier announced their intention to end the pact with the government at the end of the current Parliamentary session but had been expected to support the government on matters of confidence until then.//

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//The Liberals, however, who are also trying to distance themselves from the Labor Party before a general election expected this fall, abstained on the vote as a demonstration of their independence. Apparently they were confident that the government could survive without their support and that an election would not be called. The Liberals have done very badly in recent by-elections and in opinion polls and are in no position to face an election now.//

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//The government's preliminary count showed that the vote would be very close on a censure motion, and a loss probably would have forced Healey's resignation. By pinning the government's survival on the outcome of the decision, Callaghan, who wants to retain the upper hand in the timing of a general election, was hoping for a resounding defeat of the Tory motion. The strategy almost backfired, as the government barely survived a 287-282 vote.

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ITALY: Interior Minister Named

25X1 . [] Italian Prime Minister Andreotti yesterday chose Virginio Rognoni, a Christian Democratic member of the Chamber of Deputies, as his new Interior Minister. The portfolio, which carries major responsibility for the government's anti-terrorist campaign, had been held by Andreotti on an interim basis since the resignation of Francesco Cossiga on 10 May, following the murder of Christian Democratic leader Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades.

25X1 [] Rognoni's appointment seems designed to maintain the Christian Democratic factional balance within the cabinet and to keep the government's relations with the Communists on an even keel.

25X1 [] Although the new Interior Minister has a reputation as a serious legislator, he is neither well known nor very powerful politically and has no previous experience at the cabinet level. He belongs to the same leftwing Christian Democratic faction as his predecessor, however, and his appointment will therefore avoid pressures for a further shuffling of personnel; the choice of a more prominent politician would have created precisely these pressures. The Christian Democrats are trying to keep internal party strains to a minimum as they seek to fill the political void left by Moro's death.

25X1 [] In addition, Rognoni's faction is generally more open than others to Christian Democratic cooperation with the Communists. Andreotti presumably consulted the Communists on the appointment, and they appear to have given their approval.

25X1 []
CANADA-US: Maritime Dispute

25X1 [] //Canada's closure of its 200-mile fisheries zone to US fishermen early this month, and the reciprocal US action, becloud the prospects for reaching comprehensive maritime boundary and resource agreements. The dispute is receiving extensive media coverage in Canada, a reflection of the serious concern Canadians attach to their law-of-the sea relations with the US.//

25X1 [] //Canada's suspension of the interim reciprocal fisheries agreement for 1978 arose from its apparent impatience with

the pace of negotiations on long-term agreements with the US, as well as from recent disputes in both the Atlantic and the Pacific near-shore fisheries.//

25X1 [] //The impasse over salmon trolling on the Swiftsure Bank--between Washington State and Vancouver Island--seems to be of particular concern to the Canadians. They maintain that the number of salmon headed for US rivers that are "intercepted" on Swiftsure is not as large as the US asserts and that, therefore, the seasonal ban sought by the US is unnecessary. The Canadians also allege US overfishing on the George's Bank in the Gulf of Maine.//

25X1 [] //US and Canadian efforts since 1975 to establish maritime boundaries in the four ocean areas shared by the two countries were caught up in complex discussions over allocation of fish stocks when both countries expanded fisheries jurisdictions to 200 miles last year. Interim fisheries agreements for 1977 and 1978 were reached when negotiations failed to resolve maritime boundaries and such issues as what stocks of fish move in and out of the US and the Canadian zones, who should harvest them, and when.//

25X1 [] //Negotiation of a long-term agreement covering these complex issues will be difficult. On the issue of maritime boundaries, the two countries generally agree on the location of the boundary between Washington State and Vancouver Island. They disagree, however, on boundaries in the three other common marine regions--in the Gulf of Maine, the Beaufort Sea, and off southern Alaska. []

BRIEFS

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Japan

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[] The Japanese Diet passed legislation yesterday governing joint development of undersea resources with South Korea. This ends more than four years of contention in the Diet over the Japan - South Korea continental shelf agreement. Liberal Democratic Party leaders won an extension of the current Diet session last month to ensure passage by the upper house.

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[] Under the provisions of the enabling legislation, Japan and South Korea can grant concessionary rights to private firms for joint exploration of oil and gas resources in the East China Sea continental shelf area. The measure is certain to please South Korea, which had threatened to explore for oil unilaterally if the bill was not enacted. It almost certainly will prompt further protest from China and North Korea, which dispute both Japanese and South Korean claims in the area.

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